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INTEGRATING POLICY: A MATTER OF LEARNING 
I - INTRODUCTION 
In May 1995, the International Development Research Centre 
organized a workshop in Ottawa,, under the rubric of its 
INTESEP programme (Integrating Economic Social and 
Environmental Policy). The purpose of the workshop was to 
give practitioners actively involved in the day-to-day 
problems of building integrated social, economic and 
environmental policies in Canada, Latin America, Africa and 
Asia, an opportunity to consider how learning theory applies 
to the practical realities of field operations. 
The primary participants at this workshop were seven 
'professionals working for private or public bodies on 
activities designed to bring stakeholders with a variety of 
social, economic or environmental concerns together for face- 
to-face negotiations of integrated policies. They were 
provided with a background paper which presented a framework 
for discussion. This framework focused on how learning theory 
could be applied to the processes of building integrated 
policies and programmes. All were asked to describe their own 
activities in light of propositions about learning, and to 
discuss the validity of these principles, when applied to 
practice. The assumptions made by the organizers of the 
workshop were: 
a) That concepts derived from learning theory would 
prove relevant to the experience of building and 
implementing integrated policy; 
b) That these same concepts would provide a common 
language to facilitate the cross-cultural description 
and analysis of the processes involved in building and 
implementing integrated policies and programmes; 
c) That focusing on propositions about how learning 
relates to multistakeholder negotiations, would prove 
useful to the identification of strategies for 
interventions designed to facilitate and guide the 
processes of integrated policy development. 
Alan Thomas, Professor of Adult Education at the Ontario 
Institute for Studies in Education, chaired the workshop. 
Seven professionals led the discussions: 
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Lalla Aicha Ben Barka, Coordinator of Project ROCARE II in 
Mali, described the case of an educational research network in 
West and Central Africa, which brought together a culturally 
and linguistically diverse group of educational practitioners, 
researchers, policy makers and representatives of local 
communities, for a process of "social negotiation" on how 
African education should be reformed. 
Somsook Boonyabancha, Director of the Asian Coalition for 
Housing Rights in Thailand, described the Urban Community 
Development Office in Bangkok, which brings together community 
groups, representatives of the private sector, NGO's and 
government agencies to develop, implement and evaluate 
integrated development projects in Bangkok slums. 
Fadel Diame, Director of the Fondation Rurale de l'Afrique de 
110uest in Senegal, described the learning processes involved 
in supporting and strengthening farmers' associations in West 
Africa, which bring together scientists and villagers to 
develop sustainable integrated development projects in the 
face of massive social, environmental and economic crisis. 
Elias Mujica, from the Consortium for the Sustainable 
Development of the Andean Ecoregion, in Lima, Peru, described 
the work of "Concertation Tables" in Peru, which bring 
together provincial, district and municipal leaders, with 
universities, private sector organizations and community 
groups, to develop sustainable integrated development plans, 
in the face of opposition from the national government. 
Stephen Owen, Commissioner on Resources and Environment in 
British Columbia, Canada, described a process of multi- 
stakeholder negotiations between environmentalists, labour 
unions, community groups, private sector developers, and 
government departments, to develop mutually acceptable, 
sustainable development plans for a variety of controversial 
sites in the province. 
George Penfold, of Guelph University, and a member of the 
Planning Act Reform Commission in Ontario, Canada, described 
an attempt to bring a large number of disparate interest 
groups from the public and private sector together to develop 
new standards for sustainable integrated land use planning in 
the province. 
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Alfredo Rojas Figueroa, of the Centro de Investigacion y 
Desarorollo de la Educacion in Santiago, Chile, described how 
multiparty negotiation techniques have been applied to bring 
education professionals together with community groups for the 
development of innovative programmes in Chile's poorest 
schools.' 
This paper provides a synthesis of both the original 
analytical paradigm provided by learning theory, and comments 
on the utility of that paradigm by the workshop. The original 
theoretical paper provided twelve propositions on how learning 
theory could be applied to multiparty stakeholder 
negotiations. Those original propositions, which formed the 
basis for the workshop, have been reformulated as a result of 
the discussions, and the reformulated propositions are 
presented in an appendix to this paper along with a list of 
research questions provided by the field practitioners. 
i Background papers were also provided and discussed by Maybelle 
Durkin, Executive Director of the Canadian Home and School and Parent 
Teacher Federation, (on the development of literacy programmes), Ken 
MacKay, of IDRC (on the development of sustainable fisheries management 
policies), Anna de Rosas-Ignacio of Ateneo de manila University (on the 
development of the Philippine Social Reform Agenda) and Roger Schwass (on 
the Pakistan national conservation strategy). Other participants at the 
workshop included, from IDRC, Anne Bernard (coordinator of the workshop), 
Fred Carden, Daniel Morales-Gomez and Jamie Schnurr; David Runnalls of the 
Institute for Research on Public Policy; and Greg Armstrong. 
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II - BASIC CONCEPTS OF LEARNING 
There are a number of definitions of learning, but for 
the purposes of discussion related to the formulation of 
complex integrated policies, it is postulated here to be 
"...the capacity to interact with one's social and physical 
environment in such a way as to derive logical meaning, 
guiding principles and consistent perspective. It is a 
process which results in relatively stable changes in previous 
behaviour, attitudes or values, or the establishment of new 
ones... changes beyond what could be attributed to normal 
maturation. z 
Learning involves the acquisition of information and the 
process of converting it, through analysis, to new forms of 
knowledge; the development and extension of intellectual and 
mechanical skills; as well as the expression of new attitudes. 
Most importantly, and central to the experience of individuals 
working with the complex processes of integrating social, 
economic and environmental polices, learning results in an 
increased ability "...to predict consequences, weigh 
alternatives, perceive comparative advantage and distinguish 
salient characteristics of a situation." 
Learning is, inherently, an individual activity which is 
influenced by the characteristics of the learner and his or 
her environment; at the same time, it is a fundamentally 
social event. Learning is motivated and influenced by the 
nature of the learning context including the actions and 
perceptions of other people, the distribution of power in and 
between groups, and the learning event/task itself (that is 
the complexity, urgency, degree of newness implied). Thus, 
while an external intervention designed to achieve change may 
require the same end results of all participants, people will 
face differing degrees of difficulty in learning new 
behaviours as accommodations to personal, cultural and social 
differences are made at both individual and group levels. 
z Bernard, 1991, p.34. 
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Readiness for Learning 
This implies that interventions aimed at promoting 
multistakeholder negotiation of integrated policies, as any 
other change event, must take account of, and plan for, the 
fact of significant diversity in the readiness for learning of 
different people and the different groups with which they are 
working; and recognize that individuals and groups will be at 
different stages of learning. 
Fundamental to learning theory, and buttressed by 
experience in the field, is the fact that attention has to be 
paid to these individual learning differences when intervenors 
determine the time and the types of facilitation strategies 
required for the movement of individuals and their 
institutions towards an understanding of the requirements for 
multilateral negotiation as a new way of thinking and 
behaving. 
The broad range of interest groups involved in most 
multistakeholder negotiations brings to the table major 
differences in both the understanding of issues and of 
priorities. Groups will often have divergent experiences and 
substantial differences in access to resources, and therefore 
to power. These differences mean, in practice, that 
individuals and groups will take different approaches to 
learning the new attitudes implied by policy integration, and 
will be at different stages of readiness for the learning 
processes involved in negotiation. 
For the intervenor, enabling these groups to reach a 
stage of readiness for learning about both one another (as a 
sense of shared purpose is sought) and about the nature of the 
policy changes being proposed, is almost always in practice a 
largely unpredictable, non-linear and time-consuming process. 
The processes of negotiation themselves will need, similarly, 
to be diverse, differing from one change intervention to 
another, building from and on the differences in experience 
and learning styles of the individuals and groups represented. 
What must therefore be recognized is that these change 
interventions will often be lengthy and variable, as 
accommodations are made to the differences which participants 
have in their readiness for learning. 
One of the realities of bringing different groups 
together is that the groups themselves may see little 
commonality of interest or experience at the beginning of the 
negotiation process, and thus often have little motivation to 
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engage in the process. In the experience of one change 
intervention which brought representatives of slum communities 
to deal with bankers to negotiate new housing arrangements, 
the challenge for intervention was clear: 
"[They] did not like to learn from each other... they had 
no experience working with each and they did not want to 
have that experience." 
Unfortunately, it is these initial difficult stages of 
negotiation, designed to engage and seek commitment of diverse 
groups in the process of learning, which underlie the profound 
changes implied by policy integration. They take time, 
sometimes years, and are just the earliest stage in the 
longer-term task of what the INTESEP workshop saw as the most 
important policy integration exercise: learning to change the 
process of governance itself. 
Political leaders, who have a direct interest in the 
maintenance, exploitation or change of governance processes, 
are necessary participants in the policy change process. They 
are also, themselves, an interest group (or groups) with their 
own stages of readiness for learning the skills required for 
making changes in both policy and the in the processes of 
formulating policy. Several of the workshop practitioners, 
with experience working in different countries, cultures and 
policy domains, saw political 61ites as the most difficult 
interest group representatives to engage in the learning 
processes. "Consultation between politicians is completely 
different from consultation between other kinds of people", 
said one practitioner. These differences may reflect 
political leaders, perception of the risks which consultation 
poses to their positions of power or may reflect their 
commitments to other factors or other participants in the 
policy domain. That said, learning among politicians must 
(and does) necessarily take place in these situations, as 
different levels of government must agree to participate in 
multistakeholder policy negotiations if policies are to change 
in durable ways. 
Learning to Learn 
Learning is usefully understood in terms of a complex of 
types and levels. one theoretical distinction which has 
relevance for negotiation interventions is that between 
"loops" of learning. In simple or "single loop" learning, 
people learn from experience to adjust; for example, rewording 
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a policy which has proven ineffective. In more complex or 
"double loop" learning, negative feedback from experience 
leads a person not just to adapt or change policies or 
behaviours, but to examine the basic assumptions behind them; 
to reconsider the underlying rationale for the policy. 
Finally, in "deutero learning", a person learns how to learn; 
to begin to understand the process of learning itself.3 
This means, in effect, that: 
The most complex learning involves learning how to 
examine assumptions, how to formulate hypotheses, 
and how to collect information to test hypotheses, 
values, attitudes and behaviours. 
It is these skills, learning theory suggests, which are 
the key to governance activities; to broadening the base of 
people who are competent to intervene in the questions of 
governance which affect their lives. It is these skills which 
may help people understand different perspectives and policy 
options, to see the world in more comprehensive, less linear 
or win-lose ways. 
From the perspective of learning, a similar distinction 
can be made between different levels in the inputs to 
learning, between data, information, and knowledge. Data have 
been referred to as "unrefined, undifferentiated facts" 
without any particular context. Information can be viewed as 
organized or refined data; given a context, but not yet 
internalized by the learner. Knowledge is information which 
has been internalized, integrated into the conceptual 
frameworks of the learners.° 
One implication of this is that INTESEP research 
(research on the process of integrating economic, social and 
environmental policies) which is designed to support the 
process of change can, at best, generate data aggregated as 
information. Knowledge about the meaning of integration in 
terms of policy or programme practice depends on the 
manipulation of that information by its users, the policy and 
negotiation practitioners who must internalize and integrate 
this information with their own differing conceptual 
frameworks. This process of manipulation, internalization and 
3Argyris and Schon, 1978. 
4Rosell, 1991, p. 21. 
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integration is, fundamentally, the learning process which 
underlies the changes in knowledge, attitudes and practice 
implied by integration initiatives. 
Cognitive Structures 
It is a basic tenet of learning theory that people, and 
through them their institutions, change by building on their 
experience, skills and values -- in effect, moving from data 
through to knowledge through increasingly complex negotiations 
with the environment. The learning which underlies change is, 
thus, a naturally occurring process, happening with or without 
intervention by outside change agents, and it is motivated by 
the need everyone has to make sense of what is occurring in 
life. 
As people go through this process of making sense out of 
experience, cognitive structures are developed. These, 
essentially, are the paradigms which make dealing with 
information more efficient, by providing the "hooks" to 
interpret and manage it. These are the structures through 
which experience is put into a particular perspective, and may 
include, among other things, religious beliefs, philosophy, 
values and attitudes. When information generated from 
experience matches existing cognitive structures, previously 
learned attitudes or behaviours are reinforced. 
Learning is affected not just by experience, therefore, 
but by expectations generated by our culture and our cognitive 
structures. Also referred to as "myths", "cosmologies", or 
"learning metaphors", cognitive structures affect not just 
what is learned, but who participates in learning, how 
learning occurs and whose learning "counts".5 The cultures 
which generate cognitive structures may be broad, cross- 
national cultures such as those embodied in philosophical or 
religious concepts, or they may be subcultures at provincial, 
state, ethnic group, local community or organizational level. 
These subcultures generate micro cognitive structures which 
govern expectations about how people behave, and what is 
right. 
Because cognitive structures are so useful and are 
reinforced through use, they are also extremely difficult to 
change. It is only when experience and information does not 
5 See Thomas, 1989; Michael, 1992 for further discussion. 
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match expectation generated by cognitive structures that 
uncertainty is created, and with uncertainty the opportunity 
for new learning. But breaking down what are essentially the 
explanatory schemata for our lives is not a simple matter; it 
is these cognitive structures which are key elements in the 
type of "paradigm shifts" often involved in moving toward 
negotiated approaches to making or implementing policy.6 
Even in the face of contradictory situations, it is not 
certain that learning will take place. Or, it may take place, 
but be ultimately dysfunctional where the environment is 
inappropriate for the learning objectives, or where the 
intervention is insensitive to the culture and readiness of 
the person or groups involved. "Knowledge of the learning 
myths or metaphors imbedded in every culture is essential for 
the non-exploitive development of that culture."' The same 
holds true within cultures, of course. The varied experiences 
of the INTESEP workshop strongly endorsed the implication that 
an awareness of the existence of cognitive structures and the 
need for approaches to learning which would help extend or 
change these structures, has direct relevance to the success 
of any process attempting to negotiate across policy 
perspectives. 
There was, for example, agreement that levels of 
literacy, the language of communication and the values 
reflected by these govern both the pace of learning and 
approaches to negotiation and communication strategies. 
Multistakeholder negotiation processes tend to be organized by 
people literate in cosmopolitan languages, and the more 
powerful participants in these negotiations (government 
officials, representatives of private corporations, donor 
agencies) share this literacy. Subcultures within a social or 
political system will influence how deep and how wide is the 
adoption of the innovations implied by multiparty negotiation 
of integrated policy. Representatives of different 
departments, agencies or groups will interpret the advantages 
or disadvantages of learning the skills of multiparty 
negotiation at different speeds, and some may fail to learn 
them at all. Community representatives affected by development 
plans may be unable to communicate effectively in the language 
used by government, or be less proficient in the use of this 
language. Interventions which ignore or diminish such 
6 See Bernard, 1990 for more detailed discussion. 
Thomas, 1989, p. 5. 
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differences sow the seeds of their own failure by failing to 
address issues in the langauge and concepts of those expected 
to accommodate and negotiate them. 
Incidental Learning 
Related to the natural link of learning with experience 
is the concept of unplanned or incidental learning, generally 
understood as that learning which occurs every day as people 
interact with and negotiate their environment. Incidental 
learning occurs also in the context of planned intervention. 
Facilitators of complex policy negotiations need to recognize 
that while they may hope their advocacy, directives or 
guidance will result in new knowledge, attitudes or practice 
more or less in line with the objectives of the intervention, 
it is certain that other, unplanned, lessons will also be 
learned by the participants. 
Unplanned or incidental learning may complement or 
contradict the planned learning objectives. Examples drawn 
from practice suggest, for example, that people may learn to 
be wary or defensive in the face of information or directives 
they do not understand, or which appear to contradict their 
basic values or core beliefs. People may learn to avoid 
changes which imply risks which are beyond the capacity of the 
individual or community to manage. They may simply 
misinterpret the implications of an innovation, or fail to see 
it as different, therefore reconfirming old patterns of 
behaviour rather than learning new ones. 
Studies of the implementation of complex innovations 
suggest that policy initiatives or other innovations sometimes 
fail, get renegotiated or redirected, for reasons unassociated 
with the basic merits of the initial idea. It is essential, 
therefore, to account for incidental learning during the 
implementation process, if we are to understand why an 
innovation succeeds, fails or shifts focus during 
implementation. This is a matter of incorporating effective 
monitoring and evaluation in the implementation process. It is 
also a matter of creating an innovation implementation process 
which accounts for the perspectives, priorities and needs of 
those expected to change. 
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Congruence of Theory and Action 
For integrated policy development, another useful 
learning concept related to the notion of the natural and 
experience-based nature of learning and perhaps explaining the 
logic of incidental learning, is what Argyris and others call 
"theories of action". These are the theories derived from 
cognitive structures; essentially, the logic individuals use 
to translate the implications of these paradigms into the 
working rules which govern their own behaviour and through 
which they interpret the behaviour of others. 
These are the "theories" which tell us what is acceptable 
in behaviours and attitudes, and what is not. What is relevant 
to those involved in generating and sustaining more integrated 
policies and consensus about policy, is that these theories 
appear in two forms which do not always match: "espoused 
theory", the expressed rules governing individual or group 
behaviour and expectations; and "theory-in-practice", rules we 
actually apply. The espoused theory of sectoral 
professionals, for example, may hold that people should and 
will learn from criticism or from new information. Their 
theory-in-use, however, may be that criticism and negative 
feedback are threats to be countered by defensive argument and 
a shutdown of learning processes.g 
Interventions trying to forge consensus on inter- 
ministerial or multistakeholder policy development, or to 
sustain implementation of such policy, need to clarify both 
the "espoused theories" of those involved in intervention, and 
the "theory-in-use". If the espoused theory is to open the 
process of policy learning to incorporate dissent and new and 
unexpected policy developments, but the theory-in-use leads to 
central control of the policy development process, it is 
generally the theory-in-use which will govern what people 
learn, and therefore achieve, during the policy development 
process. Incongruence between the two is likely to undermine 
even the minimum level of agreement critical to new behaviour. 
Congruence between the means used to achieve a goal and 
the goal itself, is also a key factor in successful change 
management. If the stated goal (the espoused theory) of a 
policy intervention process is broad-based participation and 
empowerment, but the process is carefully controlled by 
outside intervenors (the theory-in-use), the probability is 
$Argyris, p. 184. 
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that people will learn not the goals of the intervention, but 
the process of control, and how to defend against it. They 
may learn not to trust each other; they may learn to expect 
answers from experts rather than from themselves; they may 
learn that they are not, in effect, "empowered"; and they may 
learn that "participation" is little more than business as 
usual. 
What people will not learn from a controlled process is 
what participation means in both its rights and its 
responsibilities, since they did not have the opportunity to 
properly test and correct their behaviours and attitudes by 
practicing participation. It is such incidental learning which 
may ultimately prove dysfunctional for change interventions, 
undermining rather than sustaining the change process. 
For integration to work, the INTESEP workshop agreed, the 
process of multiparty negotiation must not only appear to be 
genuinely participative, but must in fact be so. The process 
must generate trust that it is transparent; must reinforce the 
idea that all participants are genuinely committed to finding 
common ground, and that the participatory process is not 
simply a smokescreen to hide government's intention to proceed 
with its own agenda. 
Conclusions about Learning 
1. Learning is an activity. It involves doing 
something. Learning does not occur without the chance 
to practise through intellectual and practical 
engagement with new ideas, testing the new in the 
context of the known. 
2. Learning takes time, and the time required varies 
with different individuals within the specific context 
of their past learning, the constraints and supports of 
their present situation and the nature of the specific 
learning event. In any group, individuals will be at 
different stages of readiness for learning. 
3. Learning is irreversible. A person may relearn old 
behaviours or values, but what was previously learned 
remains a part of the world as we see it. New learning 
occurs when negative feedback causes re-evaluation of 
old constructs and adaptation to incorporate new ideas 
or information. 
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4. Learning is cumulative. Everything which is 
learned, affects everything else previously learned. 
5. No one can be coerced into learning. Internal 
motivation is required if learning is to occur. 
6. Learn=7 is continuous. It is not an outcome; it is 
a process. 
7. Learning is both a social and political process, as 
much as a psychological one. "The minute you invent an 
organization [or attempt to change one], you have 
automatically stimulated a whole set of learning 
responses" as one workshop participant said. To 
understand how people learn in groups it is necessary 
to "liberate learning from the grip of psychologists" 
and to understand it as a socio-cultural undertaking. 
There was broad recognition through the cases and 
experiences presented in the workshop that the acquisition of 
new perceptions, ideas and skills is basic to all 
interventions intended to integrate disparate interests into 
a coherent policy. The INTESEP workshop identified specific 
skills and behaviours which must be learned by both 
intervenors and participants in multistakeholder negotiation 
of integrated policies: 
a) How to identify core interests from peripheral 
interests; 
b) How to understand the interests of other groups 
(even if not accepting them); 
c) How to represent the views of one group to others; 
d) How to deal with conflict; 
e) How to find the common ground among people and 
groups with divergent interests; 
f) How to convey agreements on common ground to wider 
audiences or to interest group members who have not 
been part of multistakeholder negotiations. 
9See Thomas, 1989; Bernard, 1991. 
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III - FACTORS AFFECTING INTERVENTIONS 
Policy Communities and the Functions of Conflict 
The concept of policy communities provides useful 
terminology for linking the concepts of learning to concepts 
related to integrated policy development and implementation. 
Policy communities have been described as networks of groups 
engaged in discussion or debate on a given policy issue, or on 
a constellation of related issues. The members of any policy 
community may engage each other in discussion, but the 
community itself can be comprised of policy coalitions with 
sharply contrasting viewpoints.10 Advocacy or policy 
coalitions are comprised of individuals organized around 
common policy positions which may be based upon certain shared 
core beliefs, determined by the cognitive structures which are 
both derived from previous learning and which govern what 
learning occurs and how it occurs. 
Even when coalitions clash, it is useful to determine if 
they share any common values -- even if these are peripheral 
rather than core values. 
What needs to be recognized is that policy communities, 
sometimes referred to as "policy domains" are unpredictable, 
constituting 
...an amorphous region inhabited by people united by 
common interest in an issue without boundaries. The 
issues are often sticky, complicated, tangled and 
conflicted affairs. They reflect the coalescing of 
many ongoing social, technical and political dilemmas 
that cut across organizations, nations and 
communities." 
Lindquist suggests that advocacy coalitions engaging in 
discussion within a policy community must be committed to the 
quest for solutions to specific problems, but that the 
coalitions within the policy community should not be expected 
to embrace each others, belief systems. The learning required 
of the participating policy coalitions in a policy community 
10 See Lindquist. 
11 weisbord et. al, 1992, p. 157. 
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during the search for consensus must, therefore, begin with 
the search for a neutral language or terminology to bridge 
differences in beliefs and facilitate dialogue. The 
participants in this process must seek "credible data" to help 
focus discussions on the achievement of concrete results. 
While policy communities, as Lindquist says, are not 
always ideal fora for learning because value conflicts are 
inevitable and distrust common, learning theory suggests that 
the most profound learning and therefore the greatest 
likelihood of a change in behaviour arises from exactly such 
processes of interaction between groups with different values 
-- where these are in some way supported or facilitated. 
Most significant learning occurs where the existing 
attitudes, values and beliefs of individuals, the cognitive 
structures which govern their lives, are challenged by new 
information or experience. This creates the opportunity for 
the re-examination of those structures, assumptions and 
beliefs. Learning theory would imply, and evidence suggests, 
that coalitions with common policy perspectives are most 
likely to engage in the serious double-loop or deutero 
learning when their basic assumptions are challenged or when 
they are threatened with failure to achieve their own most 
basic objectives. Conflict, "the challenge of running our 
beliefs up against the `brick wall` of different opinion", may 
in fact be a positive force for learning which is inherent in 
conditions of negotiating or integrating ideas. 
Advocacy coalitions may only be motivated to learn new 
attitudes, to question assumptions, when they are challenged 
in situations of conflict with other groups which do not share 
their goals, their assumptions or their attitudes. The 
process of learning in this context may not be easy, but the 
outcomes can be profound if the process is allowed to run its 
course. Discussions among integrated policy practitioners at 
the workshop confirmed that conflict, or its potential, exists 
in all attempts to build negotiated and integrated policies, 
whether between individuals or within and between the 
organizations of policy coalitions. These practitioners agreed 
that the most important initial stage of change, that which 
provides government with a motivation to undertake integrated 
policy development, in most cases emerges from growing social 
conflict. 
Where the utility of conflict becomes less clear, 
however, is in its meaning and value in the actual 
construction of integrated policy. For some practitioners, 
15 
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conflict during negotiations can be turned to a learning 
advantage: "mobilizing people to try to understand the 
perspective of other interest groups", as long as it is not 
allowed to proceed to extremes, to become "pathological" and 
therefore counter-productive. Several examples of the 
potentially productive utility of conflict were summarized by 
one participant: 
"Conflict is not an uncomfortable coincidence of 
these changes,...it is central .... You should be 
thinking of conflict, planning for it, because it 
is fundamentally important to these changes, and 
if it is not there we would not be dealing with 
integrated policy and fundamental change. Trying 
to think of conflict proactively or in a positive 
sense as something we are trying to find, 
accommodate, deal with and manage 
constructively... is really crucial to the idea 
of integrated policy." 
For other practitioners, however, it is not conflict per 
se which leads to constructive change, but exposure to the 
heterogeneity, to the contending ideas, which can grow out of 
(or generate) conflicting positions. Conflict, these 
practitioners maintained, is just one manifestation of 
heterogeneity and needs to be situated in context as one 
response to differences, along with coalition building. The 
point of concern is not how conflict can be used productively 
(although that can be done) , but how intervenors can deal with 
the spectrum of different ideas and interests which will 
inevitably arise during the policy integration process. 
In this context, the concept of negotiations as 
"conversations" between policy communities or interest groups 
was seen by the group as key to understanding the process of 
interest negotiation. It is the way in which these 
conversations between groups with different experiences and 
different levels of power are conducted which determines 
whether conflict will be functional or dysfunctional to the 
process of building eventual understanding. Change, in this 
context, is the result of exposure, over time, to a 
pluralistic decision-making environment, with conflict as one 
dimension, or one response to that conversation. 
The workshop agreed that, whatever the origin or utility 
of conflict as part of the multiparty negotiation process, it 
is the most visible manifestation of the process, and the one 
16 
Integrating Policy: A Matter of Learning 
which is inevitably identified and communicated both to 
participants and to the wider public, often to ill effect: 
"The media love noise. Yet, if you are trying to 
get a consensus... that is highly public, you can 
only build consensus from the middle. You can't 
get it from the extremes. And as you build it 
from the centre, the extremes get more isolated, 
and therefore get noisier. And so you get what I 
call 'paradox noise'....the appearance of a rising 
conflict even while and because of a growing 
consensus from the middle of society." 
This situation reinforces the requirement for 
interventions to maintain active internal and external 
communication policies which emphasise to all constituencies 
the agreements which have been achieved as well as the points 
of conflict. One Canadian integrated policy development 
process, in fact, purposively involved senior news media 
figures in the process, so that they would understand the 
subtleties of the process and report the nuances of 
negotiations rather than just the visible conflicts. 
"Margins" for Learning 
Individuals and constituent groups in a policy community 
have options when confronted with a changing environment. They 
can experiment with learning which challenges closely-held 
beliefs central to their world view, or they can retreat, 
perceiving the occasion not as an opportunity but as a threat. 
Studies on the adoption and diffusion of innovations 
indicate that those who engage with change, challenge 
assumptions, and manage innovation, are those who can afford 
the risks of experimentation; those individuals who have some 
financial, psychological or social cushion which will support 
them as the experiment with innovation proceeds and if it 
ultimately fails. Learning requires room to fail -- without 
actually endangering the lives, welfare or intellectual, 
conceptual and emotional stability of the learners. This 
cushion is termed the "margin for learning". 
Margin can be provided internally within an individual or 
group, in the form of psychological energy, wealth, or good 
health. It can also be enhanced, although probably not 
created, by the use of outside resources, through provision of 
a facilitator or teacher, access to information, child-care to 
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release time for mothers, training for line officers or 
community leaders. 
A major problem for many intervention activities aimed at 
producing radical change is that the individual, community or 
institution which the intervention wants to change often has little or no margin for experimentation; may already be living 
at the limits of physical, financial or intellectual resources 
In extreme cases, such target groups will be living on the 
tenuous boundaries of survival. In these situations, the 
reaction of the community to innovation is more likely to be 
reservation or rejection than experimentation. Facilitated 
intervention can serve to provide the necessary margin, the 
"space" needed by the group to risk engaging in and testing 
management of the change process. 
It is a mistake to assume that only the poor or 
disenfranchised require margin for learning. Those with power 
including government officials, have a real need for margin. 
They want to perceive room to manoeuvre, to mitigate risk when 
experimenting with policy innovations; to ensure that changes 
will not diminish their ability to manage position and 
priorities. Margin is the necessary condition for questioning, 
testing and revising ideas and skills. Without it, the 
motivation, intellectual resources and tolerance for ambiguity 
needed for changing policy directions and for the processes of 
innovative policy formulation, will not be available, leaving 
less chance that significant learning, and therefore sustained 
change in behaviour, will occur. 
The margin for learning, for experimenting with risk, can 
be enhanced: 
a) by providing the information necessary to enable 
people to assess risk, and the alternatives which may 
cushion them from failure; 
b) by providing external financial assistance; 
c) by taking the innovation process, the experiments with 
learning, in incremental steps which reduce both the risk 
and the conflict inherent in challenging existing beliefs 
and practises - by taking these challenges and conflicts 
in practisable, negotiated, and manageable segments; and 
d) by helping people develop expanded learning capacities 
for the identification of problems, data collection, and 
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analysis, and determining what action to take on the 
analysis. 
The concept of "margin" was strongly confirmed by the 
experiences of the practitioners at the INTESEP workshop, as 
of central importance to multi-sector negotiation. The 
resources of money, expertise and research provided in one 
form or another to their member groups in all of the 
programmes they described, were cited as critical examples of 
how margin can be provided -- and of the need to do so. 
Providing the space for experiment and risk-taking constitutes 
a levelling of the playing field in multistakeholder 
negotiations; they will not succeed where only the most 
powerful groups have access to such resources. Interventions, 
by bringing these resources to the less powerful groups, 
permit them the time, tolerance and flexibility to experiment 
with new processes. There is risk for intervenors in such 
enabling activities, of being charged with bias for choosing 
which, among contending groups, require support; for not 
adequately judging who in the system needs what; for having 
insufficient or inappropriate resources to allow closure. 
Without the focus on enabling margin, however, negotiating and 
integrating processes will fail. 
The critical point is that risk is central to learning, 
and to the process of negotiating new understandings between 
groups with different interests. Unfortunately, risk is also 
a very public event in most cases of multistakeholder 
negotiation: 
"None of these are conducted in the intimacy of 
the classroom or the board room, or the small back 
room, or a variety of areas in which... there is no 
public attention, in which... mistakes can be made 
more gracefully... because there is no one there 
except those in the room to record them." 
For policy coalitions participating in the processes of 
innovation involved in achieving and sustaining consensus on 
integrated policy, the margin for experimentation will be 
greatest at the periphery of their belief systems, where core 
values are not threatened, and basic cognitive structures are 
not under immediate attack. 12 
12Lindquist, p. 149 
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on the other hand, it may be that people will only 
recognize that they have a margin for experimentation or feel 
ready to use or develop what margin they have always had, when 
their basic interests are threatened. When the fundamentals 
of assumptions and behaviour are challenged, it is easier to 
see that the margin for experimentation exists on the 
periphery of those assumptions. 
How, for example, can those with power be motivated to 
experiment with policy development models which may empower 
others? The concept of margin may help explain the motivation 
of political leaders who agree to experiment with radical 
policy innovations, when they perceive that the problems they 
face will endanger their power base if not effectively 
addressed. Threats to basic interests can provide the 
catalyst for recognizing and creating room for 
experimentation. Those with power, by definition, probably 
always have the margin needed to experiment with new 
processes. Until confronted with major environmental, social 
or economic crises, however, they may not recognize that 
experimenting with policy processes poses less of a risk than 
ignoring the problem. 
The workshop strongly endorsed the idea of government 
requiring substantial margin to accept the risk of open, 
multiparty negotiation of public policy. In the experience of 
most, the margin for experimentation for government and others 
is often provided by the fact of confrontation between 
interest groups, or between groups and the government. 
Confrontation can lead to the conclusion that there is less 
risk involved in innovation than in maintaining the status 
quo. As one participant said, "They have to realize that they 
risk being left behind if they do not participate". Said 
another, "When the state is not able to react properly, it is 
more willing to accept alternatives." Substantive 
dysfunctions, including the loss of environmental, economic 
and social options, provide government with the incentive to 
experiment. 
The issue for facilitators of change, however, is 
to recognize that margin is the space where people 
learn; it is not learning itself. 
Information, effectively and nonthreateningly presented, 
is one tool for the creation, extension and use of margin; 
skills development is another. It is necessary but not 
sufficient for those facilitating these complex negotiation 
processes to provide information, and to help those involved 
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in policy negotiation develop the skills for interpreting and 
applying information to the policy development process. 
Participants need the opportunity and support to practise and 
learn new policy formulation behaviours. 
Crises may therefore provide margin for experimentation 
to those with power, people who might not otherwise have been 
able to justify innovation and its attendant risk to their 
constituencies. As one government change agent said, " We 
react to an absolute need, or a compelling example .... We react 
in desperation." Well-designed interventions can provide 
interest groups, including government, with the room to make 
mistakes without losing immense face, and, at least in the 
short-term, without losing power. 
Government is in many cases both the provider, as well as 
the beneficiary, of margin. For example, it can offer 
guarantees of minimum payback and protection to all 
participants. And yet, while government can provide money and 
research support to decision making, without pressure from 
interest groups, it may provide neither. 
"Government simply will not produce information 
until it has to and it will not work together 
corporately unless it is forced to, almost 
publicly embarrassed." 
Such pressure, once again, can help government mobilize 
new margin for engaging in change, or to identify that margin 
for experimentation which already exists. 
Incremental Learning During Negotiation 
Innovations which are divisible are more easily accepted 
than those which are immutable, win-lose or "sturdy". They 
allow incremental approaches, negotiation and accommodation 
between new ideas and old -- the gradual adaptation of 
cognitive structures and operational paradigms in a process 
referred to as "incremental cognitive accommodation".13 
As facilitators of negotiated policies, participants at 
the INTESEP workshop agreed that breaking learning into 
incremental steps helped build consensus, strengthen 
communication with constituent reference groups and increase 
13 Bernard, 1990, p. 35. 
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both understanding and trust in multiparty negotiations. Like 
learners in any situation, people participating in 
multistakeholder negotiations require positive reinforcement; 
the "small triumphs" of concrete and substantive achievements 
necessary to confirm their sense of ownership over the process 
and give them something to take back to their constituencies. 
Incremental, iterative processes of "social conversation" 
during the negotiating process allow participants to test the 
ideas generated in the negotiating group in the context of 
their regular lives, and so maintain a transparent and 
congruent process of consultation and participation with their 
constituencies and colleagues. Breaking negotiations into 
workable increments gives people time to learn about their own 
and their opponents, core values and interests, and to learn 
where accommodations are possible. 
The implication of course, is that government must 
participate in the process of incremental change, as the most 
influential of all groups. The corollary is that if government 
is not involved until the end of the process, its 
representatives will see no incremental change, and will not 
have internalized the logic of arguments developed through an 
iterative process. If government is presented with a fait 
accompli at the end of the negotiating process, it has no 
margin for incremental experimentation, and the likelihood of 
its adopting or effectively implementing a negotiated 
integrated policy will be substantially reduced. 
The Unpredictability of Negotiation Processes 
The paradox is that there is rarely time for those 
organizing multistakeholder negotiations to proceed in a 
careful, step-by-step fashion. Confrontation, negotiation, 
and action often take place simultaneously under the pressure 
of events. The experience of field-level practitioners 
confirms this: 
"I think it is fundamentally important as a 
learning exercise, to understand that it has to be 
that way, because people's experience is not 
fragmented into a series of steps." 
"We know now that [the process] has to be 
concurrent. It's going to be messy, but it has to 
be concurrent." 
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What we are left with, therefore, is the need for 
intervenors to jump into the process, and to accept the fact 
that discussions will be iterative. Learning will proceed 
incrementally, but the increments will not necessarily unfold 
in a structured or logical sequence. The social conversation 
of negotiation and learning will proceed, however. 
Chaos theory tends to reinforce the viewpoint that 
learning should be viewed as a continuing process, not as an 
output of some other activity. It suggests that while there 
may be an underlying order to apparently chaotic systems, such 
systems will remain intrinsically unpredictable because we 
lack the tools to measure the variables involved. 
Human society is clearly a system which fits the 
unpredictable nature ascribed to chaotic systems. The 
processes implied in negotiating integrative policies reflect 
this unpredictability. Learning in any such context is going 
to be similarly "...unpredictable, both in occurrence and 
result; .... (it) seems to be not a curve, but a series of 
iterations, in which if the outcome is recognizable, it is not 
predictable. ,14 
The field practitioners agreed that "common ground" 
rather than a complete consensus is likely to be the most 
achievable outcome of a negotiation process in the midst of 
this uncertainty. While some general approximation of 
agreement to core recommendations coming out of the 
negotiation process is important, several workshop 
participants noted that intervenors have to be prepared to 
proceed even where unanimity is not possible. In situations 
where a commission must report, for example, the managers of 
the process must make it clear that a report will go forward 
based on "general approximations" of agreement, thus providing 
a motivation for all parties to continue to talk to each 
other. In cases described by workshop participants of 
multiparty negotiation where complete consensus on all issues 
was sought, the failure to achieve that complete agreement, 
led to abandonment of recommendations in even those 
subordinate areas where consensus had been reached. 
The point is clear: win-lose situations and premature 
closure of discussions are inimical to negotiated policy; 
visible room for manoeuvre is a necessary condition for 
success of negotiation processes. 
14 Thomas, 1994, p. 3. 
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Participation and Learning 
Flexibility in analysis and behaviour is therefore 
critical in the context of uncertainty and unpredictability, 
as counterbalance against the real risk and realistic fear of 
losing contact with conceptual structures and predictive 
analyses which have enabled effective action in the past. 
Certainly, all of the professionals participating in the 
INTESEP workshop agreed that flexibility of response to the 
unpredictable nature of the negotiating process was important 
to successful conclusion of policy negotiations. 
If the learning process during discussions is necessarily 
incremental, a central question becomes one of systematizing 
the process in order to increase, if not its predictability, 
at least the capacity of intervenors and participants to 
manage it. In this context, the workshop stressed, it is 
important to keep in mind what the members of diverse advocacy 
coalitions in debate within a policy community are being asked 
to do. They are being asked to participate in multiparty 
negotiations within what are typically uncertain change 
environments; to develop new or revised capacities of 
analysis, synthesis and evaluative judgement; to consider the 
point of view of people with different core values; to seek, 
exchange and interpret new and often unsettling information in 
order to better define and solve problems; and to make 
decisions in different ways in riskier environments with 
untested parameters. 
People participate to the extent that they choose, 
cognitively, affectively and physically, to engage in 
establishing, implementing and evaluating both the 
overall direction of a programme and its operational 
details. Choice, in this context, implies not merely 
an agreement to follow but an active decision to assume 
responsibility in considering the rationale, 
implications and potential outcomes of the 
programme.... 
15 
These are not easy learning tasks; they can only be 
learned through practice. Such practice can sometimes forge 
new social arrangements, and lead to the development of new 
subcultures composed of those who engage in the debate and in 
consequence build new rules for discussion and interaction -- 
15 Bernard, 1991, p. 37. 
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sometimes without counting on or looking for directions from 
traditional hierarchies. The creation of these new 
negotiation subcultures can pose a risk for the managers 
trying to control the process, but may equally serve as an 
indicator of successful "take" of the change process. 
"Empowerment" similarly assumes complex processes of 
agreeing to take on and delegate responsibility; to define, 
investigate and resolve problems; and to terminate 
participation when it is judged dysfunctional. Again, these 
imply learned attitudes and skills, and opportunities for 
practice if they are to be integrated into changed behaviour. 
Individuals learn most profoundly what they experience, and 
they will learn the skills of empowerment as they experience 
them, not as they hear about them. If learning sometimes 
proceeds most effectively by increments, the experience of 
empowerment may have to proceed incrementally, building step 
by step upon the accumulated experience and levels of 
competence of the negotiating community. The increments in 
which learning occurs will have to accommodate the different 
states of readiness for learning, different capacities for 
learning and the different rates at which individuals learn. 
Interventions by change agents trying to forge policy 
consensus among disparate groups are, therefore, learning 
events. One implication of this is that the intervenors 
themselves, the advocates of integrated policy who convene 
these events, become in effect "facilitators of learning". 
They can only be effective in this to the extent that they 
understand what they are asking others to do and recognize the 
necessity of an explicitly facilitative function. 
They must, therefore, go through the process of 
learning with the communities with which they are 
working, and they must expect to be challenged as 
part of the learning process. 
The role of professionals (e.g. the experts providing 
specialized economic, environmental or social information 
during the integration process) is ambiguous. While 
information is necessary to the creation of margin for 
learning and to empowering of local communities, how it is 
acquired, defined, valued, its credibility and the uses to 
which it is put, will ultimately determine its utility in the 
change process. Managing these issues is key; to intervene 
effectively, to attain the credibility necessary to coordinate 
and facilitate, managers must be prepared themselves to engage 
in the learning process, to suffer the uncertainty and risk of 
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shared control,, and to adjust their "visions" in conjunction 
with increasingly capable target communities. 
Ironically, managers and professionals are cited by some 
as among the most difficult of groups to engage in profound 
change processes, inhibited perhaps because the very rules of 
their disciplines and power of their positions constitute the 
core values by which they define themselves. These, too, must 
be re-examined during the policy integration process. 
Implementation of Innovations 
Attempts to negotiate integrated policies are an 
innovation to the political system. 
It is clear from research on the diffusion, adoption and 
subsequent implementation of innovations that the adoption of 
any innovation, whether an idea, a consensus on policy or a 
new technology, is not the end product of a learning process, 
but one stage in what is a continuing cycle of adaptation, 
implementation, reexamination and reinvention. The factors 
which influence adoption of an innovation, and those which 
lead to sustained use of that innovation during implementation 
-- through adaptation -- are related, but not necessarily 
identical. They include: 
a) flexibility in the organizational structure; 
b) a decentralized decision-making process; 
c) autonomy of local decision-makers; 
d) high levels of personal communication in the group; 
e) shared, rather than hierarchical, decision-making; 
f) incentives for risk-taking; 
g) organizational slack, or access to extra resources 
(i.e. the margin required for experimentation); 
h) absence of vested interests in established practice. 
Learning takes place during the decision to adopt any new 
practice, such as a consensus on the formulation of integrated 
policy. But further learning must occur during the process of 
implementation, by testing the innovation against the 
realities of day-to-day use. While ambiguity may actually 
facilitate adoption, by permitting competing advocacy groups 
to gloss over differences of opinion about the details of an 
innovation or policy, it may make adaptation and thus 
implementation problematic, as the details of difference will 
invariably emerge in practice. Old or hidden conflicts will 
emerge as ambiguity dissipates. 
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The "adoption motivation" 16 behind a decision to try out 
a new idea, innovation or policy, is crucial to what happens 
to that innovation during implementation. An "opportunistic" 
adoption motivation (i.e. the decision to try an idea because 
doing so brings in money or other resources) reflects a basic 
lack of interest and commitment by those adopting; an 
indifference to activities and outcomes of the intervention 
which will, in the end, produce no real change. What is 
learned in this case might well be how to use the system to 
sustain old behaviours (single-loop learning) rather than the 
intrinsic merits of integrating new attitudes or practice 
(double-loop or deutero learning). 
Policy change, like any innovation adopted with this 
motivation, is unlikely to be sustained in a manner 
satisfactory to the initiating vision. The innovation, 
essentially, is discarded, coopted into existing practice or 
simply ignored. What is also often learned in these cases is 
cynicism and a lack of interest in further change processes. 
This is an example of the incidental, unplanned, and possibly 
(from the perspective of the intervenors) dysfunctional 
learning which experience can generate. 
Adoption motivation based on a problem-solving 
orientation, however -- where participants are involved in 
defining, adapting and assessing the policy innovation and 
through that coming to believe in its value -- has a much 
greater chance of producing sustained change. 
If we accept that learning is a process, and that policy 
systems as a part of human society meet many of the 
characteristics of a "chaotic system" where apparent 
unpredictability is inherent, then the only road to 
sustainable implementation of a policy innovation lies in a 
continuation of the learning process during implementation. 
Implementation becomes not a "fact" achieved, but a process of 
testing, redesigning and adapting the innovation to changing 
participants and changing circumstances (or changing 
perceptions of circumstances).17 
Successful implementation does not necessarily mean the 
replication of the original innovation or policy. Case 
studies of implementation practice have demonstrated that 
16 Berman and McLaughlin, 1976. 
17 See Fullan, 1993, for a detailed discussion. 
27 
Integrating Policy: A Matter of Learning 
those policies or innovations which go through a process of 
"mutual adaptation" between the innovation and the users are 
most likely to survive and have continuing utility. 
All of the factors which affect learning during the 
process of reaching or adopting a policy consensus will also 
affect the process of implementation. Implementation is, 
essentially, a continuation of the policy or innovation 
process, not the end result of that process. Adaptive 
planning, planning which permits and encourages variation, is 
a necessary condition of its success.18 In the same way, 
sustainability is a process and not a product. The 
contributors to the sustainability of policies -- social, 
economic, political, psychological or physical -- will change 
over time. Ultimately, maintaining the balance necessary for 
sustaining the effectiveness and relevance of policy change is 
a process assuming continuing participation and active 
learning. 
Implications for Programme Evaluation 
The fact that implementation is a process -- not a 
product, but a function of continuing renegotiation -- has 
direct and practical implications for how integration 
processes are evaluated. The INTESEP workshop revealed an 
almost unanimous frustration among those coordinating 
integrated policy negotiations, over the difficulties of 
assessing whether such processes are actually happening and 
what difference they are making. 
The most important intermediate and even many of the 
final outputs of integrated planning processes are intangible: 
increased trust in government or in planning processes, better 
prospects for sustained integration of policy during 
implementation, cultural change in the bureaucracy, and the 
radiating impacts of all of these factors on interest groups 
and sectors throughout society. Evaluation processes and 
standards usually applied to other interventions or policy 
operations are probably inappropriate, and could be 
dysfunctional, for integrated activities. 
Cost-benefit analyses of such programmes may be of 
particularly dubious benefit, as one of the practitioners of 
integrated policy negotiation said: 
is See Berman and McLaughlin; Havelock and Huberman. 
28 
Integrating Policy: A Matter of Learning 
"What are the costs of not engaging in these 
activities? .... How do you evaluate it? How do you 
compare the cost of running these [new] procedures 
and developing policy and writing reports, to the 
cost of instability in the system, lack of 
investment.... The cost of sending people to jail 
for disobedience, the whole social cost of bad 
feeling, the polarization in society?" 
The negotiation of integrated policies is a political 
process, and political processes take time. A realization of 
this is particularly important where international aid 
agencies are providing assistance, as two of the workshop 
participants noted: 
"This runs completely counter to the whole 
question of evaluation of the effectiveness of aid 
money.... As a learning exercise, one of your 
products, your most important products, is 
mistakes ...and those are not looked on 
fondly .... so there's a great temptation [for 
funders] to pull the plug on investment just at 
the point when you are analyzing the mistakes and 
what you've learned." 
"In a learning organization you are going to make 
mistakes ...and mistakes are lessons, they are not 
failures. But if the problem you are trying to 
solve... is one with high visibility, if it has a 
certain amount of drama and conflict to it, 
everybody is watching you. Transparency is 
wonderful, but everybody is watching you, and boy 
are they watching you carefully. Everybody's got 
an opinion on it at this stage." 
Types of evaluation questions identified by the workshop 
as practical and valid: 
1. Did you identify the problem? 
2. Did you address the problem? 
3. Did you develop workable solutions? 
4. Did people use the solutions? 
5. Did participants see the process as fair and 
solutions as useful? 
In general, however, all participants agreed that much 
more work needs to be done on the development of evaluation 
paradigms appropriate to negotiation processes. They stressed 
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in particular the need to be concerned about internal 
formative evaluation of organizational and inter-group 
performance, particularly in terms of the more amorphous 
issues. Transparency, for example, was identified as a factor 
essential to the credibility of these processes, but one 
complicated to assess as both cause and consequence: 
If evaluation, "is the process of making the 
implicit, explicit", then the design of the 
evaluation is of the highest importance to the 
creation of a transparent process. 
The workshop stressed, too, that evaluation must include 
all those implicated in the change process in evaluation 
design and execution. Several people noted that while change 
agents often bring with them evaluation tools, they typically 
ignore the existence and efficacy of indigenous methods of 
evaluation, particularly in societies with low levels of 
literacy. This further reduces the relevance of both the 
programme and the evaluation to local problems. For deutero 
learning (learning how we learn), evaluation of process and 
product at all levels must be the concern of all participants: 
"Any organization that is withholding information 
from its donors, participants, grantees or boards, 
is not a learning organization. It is using 
knowledge as power and is on a different mission 
than learning." 
Sustaining Interventions 
Interventions which support only the early stages of the 
learning processes involved in the development and 
implementation of complex policies, are likely to fail. 
Facilitating change in the initial stages of problem 
identification or programme design is a necessary but 
insufficient condition for intervenors who want to ensure the 
level of "ownership" of the policy innovation which finally 
defines sustainability. Implementation will be successfully 
realized only to the extent that implicated policy actors 
continue to participate in decisions on adaptation, develop 
confidence in the innovation where it is testable against the 
reality of the situation, and iteratively adapt it to meet the 
changes it generates in that context. 
Sustainable integration of policy, in this sense, refers 
not to the articulated policy per se, but to the capacity of 
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the policy "system" or community, to assess and change policy 
in increasingly satisfying ways. 
What learning theory, research on adaptation and 
implementation of innovations, and practical field experience 
developing sustainable integrated policies all agree on, is 
that the process of challenging existing values, attitudes or 
practices is neither easy nor quick. While it is clearly 
possible to influence the direction which learning takes 
during these processes, it is not possible to control it. 
Attempts to rush the process will typically fail outright or 
produce only superficially desirable results. Rushing the 
process may prove dysfunctional in the long run, because what 
may ultimately be learned is not a readiness to engage in 
change, but a determination to avoid it. 
The workshop strongly endorsed the requirement for a 
long-term commitment to open and transparent consultative 
processes for the success of policy development and its 
sustained implementation. It may be that the sustainability 
of relationships and consultative processes are the most 
important outputs of the process, because it is these which 
will facilitate both the revision and the renewal of policies 
which is at the heart of sustainability in changing 
environments. 
IV - CONCLUSIONS 
It is clear that developing integrated policy is a 
complex process. Integration is required between governments 
of different levels, between departments of the same 
government, between interest groups in society, and between 
government and the civil society. 
a) Government as Participant 
The workshop agreed that government itself must be 
brought to the negotiating table as one actor among many, not 
as the ultimate arbiter of social demands, but as a 
participant putting its power and its expertise to the test of 
public discussion. Strategies which ignore the power of 
government will pay dearly; even the most independent of 
organizations requires a process of communication with 
existing systems of power. Even though "it may not feel very 
comfortable with you; [government cannot be] totally against 
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you", according to one participant, if change is to be 
meaningful and durable. 
One implication of this is that governments, or other 
agencies with the power to make decisions about implementation 
of policy, must participate. They cannot simply delegate 
participation to surrogates (eg commissions), though this may 
prove an effective intermediary measure. Sooner rather than 
later, they must buy into the process of negotiation; help 
form the policies; and come to appreciate the context and the 
logic of the arguments being made. 
The learning involved in negotiation processes cannot 
concern simply the most effective policy conclusion, but must 
also encompass an understanding of where the decision comes 
from, the interests at stake, the positions compromised, and 
the implications, in terms of conflict, if the common ground 
discovered during negotiations were to be later abandoned. 
Government agencies, because they do not themselves 
effectively integrate policy development, will have the same 
problems as other interest groups at the negotiating table and 
it is important to other participants, and to the process, 
that they bring their expertise and their interests clearly 
into the open: 
"They bring to the table reasonable expectations 
about fiscal and policy expectations as they build 
a consensus with the other participants. 
Therefore, the expectation is that if they reach 
consensus on any point, it will be implemented, 
because they have been there as a party supporting 
it. They have also been represented corporately 
in that government, whether federal, provincial or 
local, has been forced to sit at one seat at the 
table and therefore it has forced them to 
coordinate their internal conflicts in a more 
effective way." 
One case described at the workshop, of a multistakeholder 
policy formulation process where the government did not 
participate (but instead waited simply to receive the 
recommendations), faced substantial delays, significant 
stakeholder disillusion and limited impact when, in its 
handling of the recommendations, it essentially fell back on 
its own system of closed and linear review: 
"How to build congruence is still a puzzle to me 
because it is very clear that the government 
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organizations and institutions, or bureaucracies 
that are established, for the most part don't fit 
the principles of integrated policy [development]. 
How to...in the longer term, transform that 
government system in a way to house the new view 
of what policy or society is, is a huge 
challenge." 
b) Broadening the Base of Participation 
The scope and time dimensions of the changes implied by 
integrated policy making processes will affect how 
interventions are organized well beyond government, of course. 
As one practitioner observed: 
"If one sees policy as learning, and one sees 
culture as the context for learning... and action 
as an outcome, then suddenly, at least from my 
perspective, the issue becomes much broader than 
government. By focusing on adults' learning, I 
think there is a somewhat implicit statement that 
our focus is still on government. In other words, 
we can make short-term connections. On a broader 
plane, if one says what we are after is cultural 
change, we want to set up new values and attitudes 
that will, in time, even reform government, then 
why are we exclusive...?" 
To sustain long-term change, this practitioner said, it 
is necessary to broaden the processes of discussion, 
negotiation, participation and education beyond the government 
and the powerful, and beyond the immediate situation, to 
include marginal groups and youth, those who must live with 
the long-term implications of change. 19 
c) Reporting Back 
From a different perspective, broadening the base of 
participation also concerns the relationship between those 
negotiating change and the groups they represent. While 
19 How to encourage different ways of thinking about relationships 
among "communities of interest" at the school and community level was not 
on the agenda of the workshop. The participants agreed, however, that 
long-term social change must focus on this issue. 
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representatives of policy coalitions with conflicting 
interests go through a learning process at the negotiation 
table, building trust in each other and the process, their 
constituencies do not. There are often 'incongruencies 
therefore, between the mandate given to interest group 
representatives going into negotiations and the arrangements 
which emerge. 
If the process of policy development is to move smoothly 
into the processes of adoption and implementation, congruence 
requires that representatives at the bargaining table return 
to their constituencies and implicate them actively not just 
in the results of negotiations, but in the process. Interest 
group representatives must communicate clearly to their 
constituencies, in a participatory setting, how and why 
negotiations are proceeding as they are. The trust built by 
the open processes of multiparty negotiation must be matched 
equally by a trust between the groups "back home" and their 
negotiating representatives. This requires transparency of the 
negotiation process, an absence of secret deals, and 
interactive channels of communication to the general public 
and to specific constituencies. It requires that field-level 
agents who will be responsible for implementation of any 
agreements know the backstage thinking of how and why 
decisions are made. What the discussion on stages of learning 
makes clear, is that this reporting must be in a language, 
media, and pacing which make the process accessible to all 
interest groups. 
d) Provision of Margin 
The workshop agreed that top-down processes of policy 
consultation alone will not result in sustainable integrated 
policy. Government is a necessary, but not sufficient, 
provider of the margin needed for experimenting with policy 
systems as it guarantees the acceptability of the process and 
use of its products. What is needed for policy integration, 
said the leader of one very large and institutionalized 
negotiation process, is a marriage of top-down leadership and 
genuine grass-roots participation, with mechanisms to sustain 
both. 
Activities must be indigenously motivated, and must have 
access to information and expertise which goes beyond that 
available to most participants. Governments and international 
donor agencies can provide critical support for the creation 
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of margin, but if this is done, it must be within a framework 
which facilitates stakeholder ownership and does not usurp it. 
e) implications for Governance 
Tolerance of unpredictability can be built into the 
consensus and implementation processes by accepting the 
reality that learning is a complex process, that the 
initiators of policy and the professionals brought in to 
influence the building of consensus have as much to learn in 
the process as other members of the policy community and that, 
as chaos theory suggests, adaptive systems are more likely to 
survive than rigid ones .2' Learning theory indicates that we 
learn from error. A system of governance which embraces the 
learning opportunities which policy failures produce is the 
most likely to sustain itself in a chaotic and unpredictable 
environment .2' Tightly controlled strategic planning is 
unlikely to be effective in coping with such systems. Planning 
should aim not at controlling the details of operation, but at 
facilitating the adaptation required to deal with chaotic 
systems. 22 
A learning approach to government and governance thus 
implies that policy integration will ultimately "work" only 
where it is recognized as a matter of learning, requiring 
negotiation of goals, risks and rewards as a permanent feature 
of the system as a whole. Implementation of integrative 
policies requires recognizing and involving stakeholders as 
learners in an unavoidably complex and chaotic environment, 
responsible, themselves, for recreating the governance 
mechanisms implied by the integrative innovation, and 
accepting error as a necessary component of the innovation 
cycle. 
The advocacy groups which comprise a policy community are 
built around shared internal core beliefs and conceptual 
schemata which may differ in substantial and significant ways 
from one another. 
20 Levasseur and Albert, 1994. 
71 Michael, 1992. 
22 For a detailed discussion of implementation theory and integrated 
policy development, see Armstrong, 1995. 
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The challenge lies in both reconciling "data 
bases", so to speak, and managing conflicts among 
different "rules of the game", as defined by 
different constructions of social reality. The 
task for government, then, becomes not the 
attainment of consensus - though this is 
worthwhile when possible - but, realistically, the 
bounding and guiding of multiple consensi.23 
One way of encouraging, but by no means guaranteeing, 
continuing attention to the processes of decision-making, 
policy formulation and reformulation during implementation is 
to create institutions which will have as their function the 
continuing fostering of these processes. The career self- 
interest of the staff attached to such institutions may ensure 
that issues of policy process, as well as product, remain on 
the table. 
A learning approach to efforts to achieve and sustain 
policy consensus helps deal with a fundamental paradox of 
governance: that social systems produce complex and often 
unpredictable problems, but that human nature seeks 
predictability. Only through permitting experimentation with 
different means of coping with an unstable environment will 
individuals and systems involved in policy change learn the 
capabilities and acquire the confidence to sustain the change 
process. The implication of learning theory for governance is 
clearly not that the world can be made any more 
straightforward or controllable as a result of policy 
intervention, but that the individuals (and systems) involved 
can become increasingly more skilful at adapting to the 
consequences to intervention, more secure in the expectation 
of being able to continue that learning-adaptation cycle, and 
thus more prepared to engage in the kinds of policy 
negotiation implied by integration. 
All of this implies the need to focus research and 
intervention not on the sustainability of any given 
"integrated" policy, but on the sustainability of the adaptive 
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Appendix 1: 
Summary of Learning Propositions 
Proposition 1: 
Practitioners involved in developing both the initial 
integrated economic, social and environmental policies, 
and the structures and processes to sustain effective 
implementation, are involved in the process of helping 
adults from diverse communities to learn, by acquiring 
information, developing skills of analysis, challenging , 
old values and attitudes. 
Proposition 2: 
Incidental or unplanned learning which occurs during the 
process of achieving and sustaining the implementation of 
integrated economic, social and environmental policy, may 
be crucial to the success, failure or redirection of 
attempts at integration. 
Proposition 3: 
People learn different skills at differing speeds, and may 
differ in their stages of readiness for learning. 
Intervenors should attempt to assess the different stages 
of readiness for learning of the different participating 
groups in the policy process, and to accommodate these 
differences in the pace and timing of interventions. 
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Proposition 4: 
If intervenors can gain approximate understanding of the 
cognitive structures governing learning, values, 
expectations and behaviours of the different groups with 
which they work, then they will be able to anticipate more 
effectively,, the stages of learning which will be required 
to achieve consensus among groups with disparate - 
interests, and to maintain this consensus during 
implementation. 
Proposition 5: 
To effectively achieve and later to sustain consensus on 
complex integrated policy issues, there must be congruence 
between the espoused theory of encouraging participation 
and empowerment of diverse groups, and the theory in use 
which governs how open the policy consultation and 
development process really is. Because the most powerful 
learning is derived from experience, the experience of 
those participating in the policy process must be 
congruent with stated goals. People will only be 
empowered and participate, if they practise problem 
definition, data collection, analysis, debate, and 
experimentation with new policies themselves. 
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Proposition 6: 
Heterogeneity will be a positive force for learning during 
multistakeholder negotiations. Conflict, which may result 
from heterogeneity, can be used in some cases as a 
positive force for learning, in the development and 
sustaining of complex integrated policies, as long as it 
does not reach the point of violence. 
Proposition 7: 
If all parties to the process of integrating policy are to 
be motivated to experiment, intervenors in the policy 
process need to identify the margins for experimentation 
and learning which exist for each group, or to find ways 
to create that margin. 
Proposition 8: 
It will be easier to move towards and to maintain 
consensus, during discussions on integrated policy, if the 
activity is taken in small, incremental steps. 
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Proposition 9 
If 'intervenors can identify areas on the periphery of 
belief systems, or those core values of different policy 
coalitions which overlap, permitting the identification of 
common margins, experimentation with policy innovations 
and new implementation strategies will be more readily 
facilitated in those areas. 
Proposition 10: 
It is important, in creating a recognition that the margin 
for experimentation exists, to help all parties 
differentiate their core (and less flexible) interests 
and beliefs, from more negotiable, secondary interests. 
Proposition 11: 
Unpredictability should not be viewed as a negative factor 
in the process of learning how to forge integrated policy.' 
Facilitators of learning interventions should build room 
for unexpected learning outcomes into the process. 
Proposition 1 
Because innovations or policies must be subject 
reexamination during implementation, the measure of 
success of a policy should not be how closely the 
implemented policy matches the original formulation, but 
how closely the reformulated policy meets the needs of 
those affected by it. 
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Proposition 1 
Intervenors and change agents must take the time required 
to continue to provide both the learning opportunities and 
the supports required for learning to all members of a 
policy community, beyond the period required for achieving 
consensus on integrated policy. Community participation, 
an openness to adaptation of the policy, and supports to 
learning are essential throughout the implementation 
process. 
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Appendix 2: 
Implications for Action 
1. Differences in literacy levels must be accommodated 
in the planning, implementation and communication of 
results of multistakeholder negotiating processes. 
2. Any government or private agency which will be 
required to implement any element of integrated policy 
must be directly involved in the iterative process of 
policy negotiation. 
3. Reporting to constituencies must be open and 
frequent, and must reflect the participatory processes 
being undertaken in multistakeholder negotiations 
themselves. 
4. International or national agencies can productively 
provide resources to create the "margin" for 
experimentation in the creation of integrated policies, 
but if these external resources are to be productively 
applied, there must be a recognition that the 
negotiating process will be messy and time consuming. 
There are no "quick fixes" for external intervention. 
5. External resources for the creation of margin, 
should be flexibly applied, positively reinforcing 
negotiation by supporting small-scale and achievable 
pilot stages. Neutral research resources should also 
be offered on an equal basis to all participants. 
6. Intervening and donor agencies must develop 
evaluation paradigms relevant to the realities of 
conducting complex multiparty negotiations of 
integrated policies. 
7. Governments and international donor agencies must 
adopt long-term programme support policies if 
assistance is to be relevant to integrated policy 
development activities. 
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Appendix 3: 
Questions for Research 
1. How can a broader, longer-term learning perspective, 
including the education of children, be incorporated into 
the development and implementation of sustainable integrated 
policies? What changes would need to be made at the level 
of education, community development and governance systems 
to emerging processes of multistakeholder negotiation, and 
implementation of policies, to incorporate this point of 
view? 
2. What values and attitudes differentiate political leaders 
or representatives of interest groups who participate 
actively in cooperative multistakeholder negotiating 
processes, from those who do not? 
3. What cultural change is required, and what intervention 
strategies will bring political representatives of different 
parties, of different levels of government, or of different 
factions within government to the negotiating table, as 
genuine participants, rather than as observers, "hiding in 
the weeds", as one person put it, to ambush the process, if 
they disagree with it? 
4. How can intervenors plan for a learning cycle which may 
take decades? What are the practical implications for 
governments (which may change at much more frequent 
intervals) and for funding agencies? 
5. How do difference in learning styles or cognitive 
strategies, in people from different subcultures and with 
different levels of literacy, affect the intervention 
strategies necessary for negotiation and implementation of 
integrated policies? 
6. How do successful processes of multiparty negotiation 
relate learning in the negotiation group to communication 
with constituent reference groups? 
7. To what extent must conflict be proactively sought, 
identified, and released before implementable and 
sustainable integrated policy can be formulated? 
8. At what point does conflict become dysfunctional to the 
process of building integrated policies? At what stages of 
the process is it most likely to be functional or 
dysfunctional? 
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9. How do cultural differences, including those of religion, 
language and status affect reactions to heterogeneity, the 
definition of conflict, and its utility? 
10. What factors will result in government responding to 
crisis by turning to multiparty negotiation of integrated 
policies, rather than pursuing more conventional policy 
processes? 
11. What sequences of learning can be applied to 
multistakeholder negotiations in a) conditions of immediate 
crisis and b) situations where there is time to proceed 
slowly? 
12. What criteria and processes of evaluation are relevant 
to multiparty negotiation processes? 
13. How can potential incongruence between the requirements 
for open and transparent negotiation processes be reconciled 
with requirements for external evaluation? 
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